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Milton Friedman’s (1990) counterfactual analysis of what would have happened if the United
States had not abandoned bimetallism in 1873 is revisited in a general equilibrium model
of bimetallism. I ﬁnd that bimetallism would have survived and the gold-silver ratio would
have remained stable for another twenty years. If countries such as India that abandoned
silver because of its depreciation are assumed not to, bimetallism survives to World War I.
But the United States would have experienced a sharp bout of inﬂation in the early 20th
century, although milder if India stays on silver.
Keywords: bimetallism, monometallism, commodity money, exchange rate indeterminacy
(JEL E42, N10).1 Introduction
A commodity money standard is a monetary system in which a given commodity can be
turned into money at will. The most famous example is the gold standard, which prevailed
in the world before 1914. A very few other countries at that time were on a silver standard,
notably China. Yet another standard was bimetallism, a monetary system in which two
commodities, gold and silver, could be turned into money, and coins made of either metal
were perfect substitutes as money at a constant ratio. In 1914, bimetallism was extinct, but
only recently so.
In February 1873, the United States Congress revised coinage laws; in doing so, it deliber-
ately omitted to open the mints to the unlimited coinage of silver. This seemingly technical
detail eﬀectively placed the US on a gold standard, after 81 years of bimetallism. Within
months, most of the other bimetallic countries in the world had also suspended free coinage
of silver, and bimetallism had disappeared. This omission by Congress is called the “crime
of 1873,” the phrase a relic of late nineteenth-century American politics and the heated con-
troversies to which the omission gave rise (after the fact). A good part of the controversies
were fuelled by the long price deﬂation of the 1880s and 1890s, a deﬂation felt throughout
the gold standard world. This deﬂation was followed by equally large inﬂation in the years
leading to World War I.
In a recent paper, Milton Friedman (1990) revisited the crime of 1873. The question he
sought to answer was the following: had the US retained its bimetallic system, what would
the price level have been? In particular, would it have exhibited the alternation of deﬂation
and inﬂation that actually took place? To do this, he constructed a counterfactual. He
supposed the US had continued to freely mint the silver dollar after 1873 at the pre-Civil
War silver content, and kept the silver dollar as unlimited legal tender. He found that the
price level would have been more stable. This paper revisits the issue by using another model
(Velde and Weber 2000).
2 Friedman revisits the Crime of 1873
I begin with a brief account of Friedman’s counterfactual. The underlying assumptions are
as follows:
11. production of both metals would not have changed;
2. the US would have eﬀectively been on a silver standard;
3. monetary demand for silver outside the US would not have changed;
4. the US stock of monetary gold would have been absorbed by rest-of-world monetary
uses and world nonmonetary uses proportionately;
5. the price of gold would have risen in proportion to the stock of monetary gold.
Friedman constructed a model embodying those assumptions, used data to estimate the
model, and computed a hypothetical gold-silver ratio and price level.
To present the model, I use the following notation. For each metal i (where i = g;s for
gold and silver), the world supply of the metal is yi, monetary demand for the metal outside
the US is mi
¡US, monetary demand for the metal in the US is mi
US, world nonmonetary
demand for the metal is di, world income is I. A ˜ over a variable indicates that it is
counterfactual.
In Friedman’s model, the price of silver ps (in goods per ounce of silver) is determined by
clearing the market for newly produced silver, in which the annual supply of new silver ys is
equated with the sum of the rest-of-world monetary demand ms
¡US, US monetary demand
ms
US, and world nonmonetary demand for new silver ds (which includes the US). This last
variable is a ﬂow which may be positive or negative, depending on whether silver is added
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s
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s: (1)
By assumptions 1 and 3, ys and ms
¡US are unchanged. By assumption 2, the US would
have used silver instead of gold as medium of exchange. But the real value of the stocks of
commodity held for that purpose is the same in any commodity standard, thus ˜ ms
US = ˜ psm
g
US.
World nonmonetary demand for silver is assumed to be a linear function of the price of gold
pg, the price of silver ps, and world income I, estimated by linear regression.
World income is assumed to be unchanged: ˜ I = I. The price of gold ˜ pg (in goods per
ounce of gold) is determined in the following way. By assumption 5, its inverse (the price
2level in the gold bloc) is proportional to the hypothetical stock of monetary gold, which can
















¡US + dg (2)
so that








¡US + dg : (3)
Finally, the price of silver ˜ ps, which is the inverse of the hypothetical price level in the




¡US + ˜ psm
g
US + [˜ ps ˜ pg I]¯ (4)
where ¯ is a 3 £ 1 vector estimated by linear regression as noted above.
Friedman found that the US adoption of silver would have kept the price of silver relative
to gold low enough that the (silver-based) price level in the US would have been higher, but
not excessively so. The price level would have been more stable, that is, the deﬂation from
1873 to 1896 (-1.7% per year) and subsequent inﬂation from 1896 to 1913 (+2.0%) would
have been replaced by stable prices throughout, except for some inﬂation in the 1890s (see
Figure 5).
The result is a little surprising. After 1873, the value of silver fell by 55%. The silver bloc’s
price levels were ﬁxed in terms of units of silver, hence prices must have gone up signiﬁcantly
in those countries, relative to gold standard countries. In Friedman’s counterfactual, the US
changes sides from the gold to the silver bloc. Friedman’s result is that the resulting increase
in demand for silver is enough to push up the price of silver relative to gold, and avoid large-
scale inﬂation in the silver-based US. This is evidenced by Friedman’s hypothetical gold-silver
ratio in Figure 4, whose path is much lower than the actual path.
Some aspects of Friedman’s analysis are unsatisfactory. The model of the silver market
embodied in 1 assumes that the metal is nondurable in nonmonetary uses, since existing
stocks have no bearing on the current price of silver. The gold market is not modelled
explicitly (in the appendix, he explains why his attempts to do so failed). Assumption 3 is
not consistent with the principle that real balances do not depend on the metal in which
they are held. Assumption 2 is an assumption about prices (that the gold-silver ratio would
have been above the legal ratio of 16) which is actually violated for a few years in his
counterfactual results.
3I bring to bear a recent model of bimetallism, namely Velde and Weber (2000). The
exercise diﬀers from Friedman’s from the points of view of theory and data. From the
theoretical point of view, the model obviates most of Friedman’s assumptions, keeping only
1. That is, I do not model the production of gold and silver, and retain the assumption that
the production of gold and silver would not have changed, irrespective of price changes. I
model the market for gold and silver, and endogenously determine the split between monetary
and nonmonetary stocks for both metals in response to price changes. I also determine in the
context of the model whether the US would have been eﬀectively on a bimetallic standard
(with both gold and silver circulating) or only silver. The model also allows changing the
monetary systems in the other countries. These advantages come at the cost of specifying a
particular form for preferences.
3 A general equilibrium model of bimetallism
3.1 The model
Time is inﬁnite and discrete. The model is intended to represent the world economy. There
are three types of goods in the model: a nonstorable general consumption good »t, and
nondepreciating stocks of gold and silver metal Q1;t and Q2;t. In each period, there is a
given amount of consumption good, and given increases (or decreases) in the stocks of gold
and silver. Total quantities of all goods are thus stochastic and exogenous to the model; the
model is a pure exchange economy.
What is determined within the model is the distribution of gold and silver stocks between
monetary and nonmonetary uses. Gold and silver can each be in either of two forms: coined
or uncoined. All gold (respectively silver) coins are of the same size and are called dollars.1
Let mi;t (i = 1;2) be the number of existing coins, and di the quantity of either metal in
uncoined form. There is an adding-up condition:
Qi = mi;t + di;t
I assume that it is costless to convert metal from one form to the other. Metal is coined
1I normalize measurement units by using US monetary standards, so that gold stocks are measured in
gold dollars (1 gold dollar = 1=20:69 tr oz) and silver dollars (1 silver dollar = 1=1:2929 tr oz).
4because money is needed for purchases of the consumption good to meet a cash-in-advance
constraint described shortly. Converting from coined to uncoined is melting, and convert-
ing from uncoined to coined. A key feature of a commodity money standard is that both
operations be unimpeded.
A representative household’s preferences are deﬁned over the consumption good and over
the stocks of uncoined metal. That is, the household derives direct utility from the uncoined





t [u(ct) + v(dt+1)] (5)
where dt+1 stands for (d1;t+1;d2;t+1), the end-of-period stocks of jewelry.
The timing is as follows. At the beginning of period t, the household holds stocks of coins
and jewelry mi;t and di;t. Exogenous increases or decreases in the stocks of metal Qi;t+1¡Qi;t
accrue directly to the stocks of jewelry held by the household. The household also received
the period’s endowment of consumption good »t which it cannot consume directly, but must
purchase from the ﬁrm. The household sells its endowment to the ﬁrm in exchange for
end-of-period proﬁts. The ﬁrm sells to the household the consumption good at a price pt ,
and increases in jewelry holdings hi;t at prices qi;t (all prices are denominated in gold coins).
These transactions are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint in which both coins are perfect
substitutes, but silver coins are valued at an endogenous price et (in gold coins per silver
coin).2
A minor complication needs to be introduced at this point. The model in Velde and Weber
(2000) was intended to formalize the idea of worldwide bimetallism. Here, I will estimate the
model using data from the period after 1873, when bimetallism had disappeared. To make
use of the data, the model has to be modiﬁed to include two features. One is the existence
of ”limping standards”, monetary systems where the currency is pegged to gold but consists
in large part of (overvalued) silver coins.3 The other is the existence of separate gold and
silver blocs, regions of the world where only one or the other metal was legal tender and
2The correspondence with Friedman’s model is: e = ps=pg, p = 1=pg.
3Such was the case in the United States and France. In fact, many countries that abandoned silver or
bimetallism kept their existing stocks of silver coinage, rather than retire them and replace them with gold;
thus placing themselves on a limping standard.
5freely minted.
The ﬁrst feature is represented by having part of the money stock consist of overvalued
silver coins: the number of coins is ¯ m2;t+1 and the legal tender value of each coin is ¯ et > et.
The numbers ¯ m and ¯ e are allowed to change over time as the number of countries adopting
the limping standard changed, and the degree to which their coins were overvalued varied.
These numbers are thus taken as exogenous and given by the household.
The second feature is represented by two separate cash-in-advance constraints, requiring
that a certain fraction ®1;t > 0 of (world) consumption, corresponding to the share of the
gold bloc in world monetary transactions, be paid for with gold or overvalued silver, the
other ®2;t > 0 in silver:
m1;t + ¯ et ¯ m2;t+1 ¸ pt®1;t»t (6)
etm2;t ¸ pt®2;t»t: (7)
Again, the numbers ®i;t are taken as given and exogenous by the household, and satisfy
0 < ®1;t+®1;t · 1. In the period 1873–1913, I consider that ®1;t+®2;t = 1. The counterfactual
will consist in removing the United States from the gold bloc, that is, subtracting ®US;t from
®1;t), where ®US;t represents the share of the US in world consumption.4
The cash-in-advance constraint is:
ptct + q1;th1;t + q2;th2;t · m1;t + etm2;t + ¯ et ¯ m2;t: (8)
The ﬁrm then decides the quantity ni;t of coins to mint, and the quantity ¹i;t of coins to melt.
At the end of the period, the ﬁrm pays proﬁts Πt, in the form of coins, to the household.
The household maximizes utility (5) subject to the cash-in-advance constraints (8), (6),
(7), the budget constraint:
m1;t+1 + etm2;t+1 · Πt + (m1;t + etm2;t + ¯ et ¯ m2;t+1 ¡ ptct ¡ q1;th1;t ¡ q2;th2;t) (9)
and the restriction that and
di;t+1 = di;t + hi;t + Qi;t+1 ¡ Qi;t; (10)
given initial stocks mi;0 and di;0.
4It will also require moving the American stock of overvalued silver ¯ mUS out of the gold bloc.
6The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts
Πt = pt»t + n1;t ¡ ¹1;t + q1;th1;t + etn2;t ¡ et¹2;t + q2;th2;t (11)
subject to ni;t ¸ 0, mi;t ¸ ¹i;t ¸ 0, and the condition
hi;t = ¹i;t ¡ ni;t: (12)
An equilibrium is a collection of prices fpt, qi;t, etg and quantities fct, hi;t+1, di;t+1, mi;t+1,
ni;t, ¹i;tg such that households choose ct, hi;t+1, di;t+1, mi;t+1 to maximize their utility taking
prices as given, ﬁrms choose ni;t, ¹i;t to maximize proﬁts taking prices as given, and markets
clear: »t = ct and mi;t+1 = mi;t + ni;t ¡ ¹i;t.
The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions are, for gold, that q1;t ¸ 1 and n1;t = 0 if q1;t > 1;
¹1;t = 0 if q1;t < 1; ¹1;t = m1;t if q1;t > 1. For silver, they are that q2;t ¸ et and n2;t = 0
if q2;t > et; ¹2;t = 0 if q1;t < et; ¹2;t = m2;t if q2;t > et. The implications are that q1;t ¸ 1
and m1;t+1 = 0 if q1;t > 1; q2;t ¸ et and m2;t+1 = 0 if q2;t > et. That is, the price of gold
jewelry is no less than 1, and all gold coins have been melted if it is above (gold coins are
the numeraire). The price of silver jewelry is no less than et and all silver coins have been
melted if it is above. Since ®i;t > 0 for all i, t, then the cash-in-advance constraints (6) and
(7) must be met, and the price of jewelry must always be 1 and et respectively.






















· 0 if m1;t + ¯ et ¯ m2;t+1 > pt®1;t»t,


















with (15) holding at equality when (8) does not bind, and use of the notation vi(dt+1) =
@v=@di(d1;t+1;d2;t+1).
Equation (13) is an asset pricing equation for jewelry, inequalities (14) require that one
currency not be dominated in rate of return by the other if it is held outside its bloc,
inequality (15) places a lower bound of 1 on the gross nominal rate of interest.




















while (12) and (8) imply that
pt»t = m1;t+1 + ¯ et+1 ¯ mg;t+1 + etm2;t+1
= ( ˆ Q1;t+1 ¡ d1;t+1) + et( ˆ Q2;t+1 ¡ d2;t+1) (18)
where the “adjusted” total stocks are deﬁned as ˆ Q1;t+1 ´ Q1;t+1 + ¯ et+1 ¯ mg;t+1 and ˆ Q2;t+1 ´
Q2;t+1 ¡ ¯ mg;t+1.
Given the exogenous processes » and ˆ Qi, the equilibrium sequences e, d1 and d2 must
solve equations (16), (17) and (18), subject to the constraints (6), (7), and (14).
In the case where no country adheres to bimetallism (which was the case after 1873),
then ®1;t + ®2;t = 1 for all t and the equations can be written as
vi(dt+1) = ®i;t
u0(»t)»t









ˆ Q2;t+1 ¡ d2;t+1




3.2 Steady states and counterfactual
Velde and Weber (2000) show conditions under which bimetallism, deﬁned as an equilibrium
in which et = e and mi;t+1 ¸ 0, is a possible outcome. There is a range of possible exchange
rates, or legal ratios between gold and silver, compatible with bimetallism. The range is
determined by the exogenous variables, namely the total stocks of gold and silver, and also
the sizes of the gold and silver blocs.
The equations describing steady states with bimetallism are
v1(d) = (1 ¡ ¯)u
0(»)=p (21)
v2(d) = e(1 ¡ ¯)u
0(»)=p (22)
p» = ˆ Q1 ¡ d1 + e( ˆ Q2 ¡ d2) (23)
8with ˆ Q1 ¡ d1 ¸ ®1p», ˆ Q2 ¡ d2 ¸ ®2p».
The method of the counterfactual is as follows. We will use the equations characterizing
the steady states of the model. Let a ˜ denote a counterfactual value for a variable. Let
X = (1 ¡ ¯)u0(»)» which does not change under the counterfactual.
The actual variables satisfy
v1(d)( ˆ Q1 ¡ d1) = ®1X (24)





ˆ Q1 ¡ d1




For each year, we take the exogenous values of »t, ˆ Qi;t, ®i;t as given. We remove the United
States from the gold bloc, which changes ®1;t and ˆ Qi;t to the counterfactuals ˜ ®1;t = ®1;t¡®US;t
and ˜ Qi;t. We check ﬁrst if there is a bimetallic solution at the ratio e = 1, by ﬁnding ˜ d1 and
˜ d2 solving v1(˜ d) = v2(˜ d) and
v1(˜ d)( ˜ Q1 ¡ ˜ d1) + v2(˜ d)( ˜ Q2 ¡ ˜ d2) = X = v1(d)( ˆ Q1 ¡ d1)=®1
and also satisfying
˜ Q1 ¡ ˜ d1 ¸ (®1 ¡ ®US)( ˜ Q1 ¡ ˜ d1 + ˜ Q2 ¡ ˜ d2) (27)
˜ Q2 ¡ ˜ d2 ¸ ®2( ˜ Q1 ¡ ˜ d1 + ˜ Q2 ¡ ˜ d2): (28)
If the ﬁrst equation is violated, the US is eﬀectively on the silver standard and the
equations are
v1(˜ d)( ˜ Q1 ¡ ˜ d1) = (®1 ¡ ®US)X (29)
v2(˜ d)( ˜ Q2 ¡ ˜ d2) = (®2 + ®US)X (30)
(31)
If the second condition is violated, then the US is eﬀectively on the gold standard and
the equations are
v1(˜ d)( ˜ Q1 ¡ ˜ d1) = ®1X (32)
v2(˜ d)( ˜ Q2 ¡ ˜ d2) = ®2X: (33)
(34)





and that in the silver bloc as ˜ p=˜ e. When bimetallism exists, they coincide.
4 Data
I make use of the following annual data, from 1873 to 1913:
(a) the average value in December of the gold-silver ratio,
(b) the total stock of gold and silver in the world at the end of the year,
(c) the stock of gold and silver coin in each country at the end of the year,
(d) the actual price level in the United Kingdom, taken to represent the gold bloc.
4.1 Sources of the series
Series (a) and (d) are taken from Friedman (1990). Series (b) is described in Velde and
Weber (2000) and are essentially the same as that in Friedman (1990). The major diﬀerence
with Friedman concerns series (c). Friedman took his data in Kitchin (League of Nations,
1930) and Drake (1983). They have the unfortunate feature that, between 1873 and 1890,
when the price of silver falls by 40% relative to gold, gold nonmonetary stocks rises by 15%
relative to silver. This is diﬃcult to reconcile with the kind of preferences for gold and silver
that I wanted to use, so I looked for alternative estimates of monetary stocks.
Kitchin and Drake had both estimated monetary stocks as residuals: they estimated how
much gold and silver was produced each year, and how much went into industrial uses; the
remainder accruing to money stocks. To come up with another estimate, I estimated money
stocks directly by adding up national money stocks for each year, and took nonmonetary
stocks to be the residual. The Annual Reports (U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 1873–1914)
provide estimates of these national money stocks for a growing list of countries in 1873, 1878
to 1883, 1892 to 1907 and 1909 to 1913. Using Maddison’s (1995) data, I ﬁnd that the sample
of countries in the Reports represents half of world output in 1873, three quarters in 1883,






























Figure 1: Ratio of total and nonmonetary stocks of silver and gold, 1873-
1913.
and over 90% after 1892. The Reports’ estimates can be improved on the basis of recent
scholarship for some countries, together accounting for about 50 to 55% of world output.
They thus represent a large, but not suﬃcient fraction of the world. I have relied on the
Director of the Mint’s estimates for the remaining countries, with interpolations and guesses
for missing years (see the Appendix for details). All told, my estimates cover between 92
and 98% of world output over the sample period.
As it turns out, the estimates of nonmonetary stocks for 1873 are quite close to those of
Kitchin and Drake used in Velde and Weber (2000), but diverge after that date. Figure 2
plots the market ratio against the ratio of estimated stocks. The slope is negative, which is
an improvement.
4.2 Estimation of preferences


































































































Figure 2: Gold-silver market ratio (December average for each year) plot-
ted against ratio of estimated worldwide nonmonetary stocks, in logs. The
regression line is computed excluding the observations for 1894 to 1903 (see
text). Units are normalized so that a gold-silver ratio of 1 corresponds to
the US legal ratio of 16.
12Our speciﬁcation obviates the need for a time series of world income.







As Figure 2 suggests, there is a somewhat anomalous period from 1893 to 1903. In 1893,
India discontinued free minting of silver, and at the same time Austria and Russia committed
to a gold standard, and the American silver purchases came to an end. The resulting fall in
the price of silver was not accompanied by an immediate adjustment in quantities. I use the
sample from 1873 to 1893 and 1904 to 1913 only.
The stand taken here is that Estimation by ordinary least squares yields (standard errors
in parentheses):
log(d1=d2) = ¡0:224log(e) ¡0:286 (35)
(0:0172) (0:0085) (36)
which means an elasticity of substitution between gold and silver of -0.22. I then estimate
½ = 1 ¡ 1=0:224 = ¡3:46 and a = exp[(
½¡1
½ ) ¤ (¡0:286)] = 1:445.
Figure 3 plots the actual gold-silver ratio and the ratio predicted by the model. As
expected, the model deviates from the actual ratio in the period 1894–1903, but does well
before and after. In what follows, I will take the results of the counterfactual to be more
dependable outside the period 1894–1903.
4.3 Uses of the series in the counterfactual
The variables in the model are the total stocks Qi, nonmonetary stocks di, monetary stocks
mi and ¯ m2, gold-silver ratio e, world output », shares of world output in the gold and silver
blocs ®i. I have corresponding data series for all but » and ®i. The shares ®i are computed as
shares of the money stocks of each bloc in the world money stock, where the silver bloc’s stock
is valued in terms of gold at the market ratio (this makes equation 20 hold by construction).
Finally, as I only need X = (1¡¯)u0(»)», I compute it as X = v1(d)( ˆ Q1¡d1)+v2(d)( ˆ Q2¡d2),
using the estimated preferences for v.






























Figure 3: Gold-silver ratio, actual and predicted.
5 Friedman revisited
The results of the counterfactual exercise are displayed in Figures 4, 5, and 6, where I
compare the actual series with Friedman’s and our counterfactuals.
The broad thrust of the results is to conﬁrm Friedman’s ﬁnding of greater price stability
in the 1880s, but not over the whole period. I ﬁnd that the market ratio would have been
initially below 16, meaning that the US would have begun on a gold standard, minting only
gold coins. Quickly, however, the US would have been on an eﬀective bimetallic standard,
and the market ratio would have been stabilized at 16:1. Ultimately, however, gold would
have been driven out by silver in the US money stock and, by 1903, the US would have been
deﬁnitively on silver.
As long as bimetallism would have been in eﬀect, the price level in the US would have
been pegged to the price level in the gold bloc. The gold-bloc price level would have been
more stable than it actually was, and our counterfactual price level for the gold bloc is
very close to that of Friedman, until 1896. But, after the US is pushed oﬀ bimetallism, US
prices rise dramatically, almost doubling over a decade, while prices in the gold bloc rise less





























Figure 4: Gold-silver ratio, actual, in Friedman’s counterfactual, and in our
counterfactual (stars).




























Figure 5: Price level in the US (silver bloc): actual, in Friedman’s counter-
factual, and in our counterfactual (stars).



























Figure 6: Price level in the UK (gold bloc): actual, in Friedman’s counter-
factual, and in our counterfactual (stars).
























Figure 7: Counterfactual amount of US gold money stock, and total US
money stock.




















































































Figure 8: Counterfactual stocks of gold and silver.
strongly, but higher than in Friedman’s calculation.
What explains the diﬀerence? Given the diﬀerences between the models and the data, it is
diﬃcult to say. I can only give an intuitive description of what happens in our counterfactual.
Consider ﬁrst the question of the standard. In our counterfactual, the US goes from
eﬀective gold, to bimetallism, to eﬀective silver. The pattern, and its causes, can be seen by
computing the bounds on allowable bimetallic ratios imposed by the total stocks and by the
size of the gold and silver blocs under the counterfactual. The result is shown in Figure 9.
The 16 ratio is above the bounds at ﬁrst in the gold standard region, then within the
bounds, then in the silver standard region. Two factors move around the bounds: the total
stocks of each metal, and the monetary demands of the rest of the world, which in turn
result from each country’s choice of standard, and each country’s share of world economic
activity. As Figure 1 shows, silver became relatively scarce after 1896, which should have
tended to push a bimetallic country toward the gold standard. Figure 9 shows that the US
would have been pushed instead to the silver standard. This results from the fact that an
increasing number of countries adopted the gold standard, and that the demand for money





















































Figure 9: Upper and lower bounds on the legal ratios compatible with
bimetallism, under the counterfactual.
from those countries grew very fast. In the counterfactual they need gold, and they take
it from the US, which replaces it with silver, to the point where it has no gold left. The
gold-silver ratio ceases to be pegged to 16, and silver now depreciates.
Once the US currency is eﬀectively on a silver standard, the US price (silver price of
goods) is the price level in the gold bloc (gold price of goods) times the gold-silver ratio.
Moving the US from the gold bloc to the silver bloc decreases the overall demand for gold
and increases that for silver; that has two eﬀects, a cheapening of gold (rise in gold price of
goods) and an appreciation of silver (fall in the gold-silver ratio), compared to what actually
happened. These two eﬀects work in opposite directions on the US price level. Whether the
US price level would have been stable depends on how these two series move over time, and
which eﬀect dominates the other.
To understand a little better the potential eﬀect on the gold-silver ratio, consider again
Figure 1, which plots actual ratios of stocks of silver and gold. The bottom line is the ratio
of worldwide supplies. It clearly falls after 1896, as gold becomes more abundant. The top
line is the ratio of nonmonetary stocks, or jewelry. It moves in the opposite direction: more
18silver is used in jewelry. If one forgets about monetary uses of the metals for a moment, this
seems counter-intuitive: as gold becomes more abundant, it ought to be used more. But this
is a period where monetary uses are changing considerably, both because more countries are
abandoning silver and adopting gold, and also because gold-bloc countries are growing very
rapidly. This frees up silver for jewelry, and also takes away gold from jewelry.
Moving the US from the gold to the silver bloc goes against this, by propping up the
demand for silver and reducing the demand for gold. The quantitative question is whether
this is enough to bring down the gold-silver ratio at a time when gold prices are going up.
After the abandonment of silver in India and much of Asia, further increases in silver
supply were not absorbed by monetary stocks as previously. In our counterfactual, the
United States is able to absorb much of what the former silver countries did not take up
(Figure X). As a result, monetized silver forms 40% of the world stock of silver, as it did in
1873. Thus, moving the US from the gold to the silver bloc does reduce the nonmonetary
uses of silver, but not enough to reverse the trend in relative prices, only to dim it.
Friedman ﬁnds a rise in the gold-silver ratio, but in the 1890s, when the gold bloc price
level is at its lowest, the latter cancelling the former to a large extent. I ﬁnd a rise in the
gold-silver ratio of a similar extent (about 70%), but in the period after 1900. As it happens,
it coincides with a 25% rise in prices in the gold bloc, larger than in Friedman’s calculation.
As Figure 8 shows, monetary gold is higher in the counterfactual in the 1900s (in spite of
the US moving from the gold bloc), because I treat gold demand endogenously, and cheaper
gold means the remaining countries need more of it to carry out their transactions. The
eﬀect turns out to be fairly large.
5.1 India’s choice
Our counterfactual took as given what the rest of the world actually did, in terms of monetary
systems. The year 1893 was particularly decisive. In that year, India, which had been on a
silver standard, suspended free coinage of silver, eﬀectively unpegging its currency, the rupee,
from the falling price of silver. Within a few years, the government of India had established
a variant of the gold standard, known as the gold exchange standard: the actual currency
in India remained the silver rupee, but its value was pegged to gold, or more precisely to
the British pound sterling, in the following way: the government bought and sold rupees in





























Figure 10: Gold-silver ratio, actual, in Friedman’s counterfactual, and in
our counterfactual (stars).
India at a ﬁxed price in exchange for pounds sterling in London (see Keynes 1913). Similar
systems were later used by other Asian countries when they switched from silver to gold,
demonstrating that the medium of exchange and the price to which it was pegged were
distinct issues.
The reason India abandoned silver was its falling price, which was generating inﬂation in
India and making imports more expensive (the argument that Indian exports were thereby
made more competitive did not appeal to the authorities, since proﬁts returned to British
investors were depreciating).
Clearly, under our counterfactual, such a fall in the price of silver does not happen. It is
therefore logical to imagine that India would not have abandoned silver. By keeping India in
the silver bloc, I can postpone the end of American bimetallism by a few years; the growing
demand from the gold bloc remains overwhelming. However, two other countries made a
switch to the gold standard at about the same time: Austria-Hungary in 1892, and Russia
in 1897. With India, these countries account for 20% of world GDP in 1913, slightly more
than the United States. It turns out that keeping them all in the silver bloc is enough to


























Figure 11: Price level in the US (silver bloc): actual, in Friedman’s coun-
terfactual, and in our counterfactual (stars).
save bimetallism until 1913, as indicated by the variant plotted in Figure 10. The gold-silver
ratio remains almost constant at 16 throughout the period.
What happens to the US price level in this counterfactual? The result is shown in
Figure 11. I see the same pattern until 1900, obviously; I still see a rise in prices afterwards,
but more moderate.
6 Conclusion
The results of my counterfactual partly vindicate Friedman’s exercise, and in some ways
reinforce it. The US would have remained a bimetallic country for twenty years, and its
price level (indeed, price levels around the world) would have been more stable. However,
abandonment of silver by other countries would have ultimately forced the US oﬀ bimet-
allism and onto the silver standard, where it would have been alone with China. The sharp
depreciation of silver in the early 20th century would have induced considerable inﬂation.
In short, the stability of the price level in the 1870s and 1880s would have been paid with






























Figure 12: Price level in the UK (gold bloc): actual, in Friedman’s coun-
terfactual, and in our counterfactual (stars).
























Figure 13: Counterfactual amount of US gold money stock, and total US
money stock.




















































































Figure 14: Counterfactual stocks of gold and silver.
higher inﬂation in the 1900s.
This result raised a question: Would it have made sense for other countries to have
followed the policies they did follow, given that continued adherence to bimetallism by the
US would have modiﬁed the outcome profoundly? Without modelling countries’ policies it
is diﬃcult to answer that question, but a counterfactual exercise that prevents the big silver
countries from adopting gold as they did in the 1890s saves bimetallism up to World War I.
237 Appendix 1
The Annual Report of the Director of the Mint published estimates of gold, silver and paper
stocks of money for foreign countries, ﬁrst in 1873, then from 1878 to 1883, and ﬁnally every
year from 1892 (except 1908). Over time, the number of countries covered grew, and the
estimates were progressively improved. The estimates are given in US dollars. The stocks
of gold can be converted to troy ounces at $20.69 per troy ounce. The stocks of silver can
also be converted into weights using the legal ratio for silver currencies, which the Reports
provide: when the ratio is N, then silver is being valued at $20:69=N per troy ounce. The
ratio might be diﬀerent for large and small silver denominations, in which case one needs to
know the proportions of each type of coin in the total stock.
For a dozen countries, I have replaced the estimates from the Reports with ﬁgures from
more recent scholarship. In many cases only the total coin stock is reported by these more
recent studies, in which case I used the proportion of gold and silver coins (and, when needed,
the proportion of small and large denominations) of the Reports.
For the other countries, I have used the ﬁgures from the Reports. Gaps are interpolated
linearly. When the estimates for a given country ﬁrst appear later than 1873, I assume that
the ﬁrst reported value was also the true value from 1873.
China: The Reports rely on Haupt (1884) who guessed a silver money stock of £150m.
I estimate the money stock in China based on a regression of total coin stocks on GDP.
The GDP ﬁgures are those of Maddison (1995) adjusted for current borders. The estimated
relation is:
log(M) = 1:0622 ¤ log(Y )+ 1:1831 (37)
(0:066587) (0:20835) (38)
(39)
The predicted values for China’s money stock in 1870, 1900, and 1913 are then linearly
interpolated.
France: gold and silver stocks to 1909 from Sicsic (1989) and Flandreau (1995). The gold
amount is converted to dollars at $0.193 per franc. The silver stock comprises 5F coins with
90% silver and subsidiary coinage with 83% silver; I use the US Mint reports’s estimate of
the share of 5F pieces in the total silver stock. After 1909 I assume that the silver stock
24is constant and the gold stock grows at the same rate as the average of the US, UK, and
Germany.
Germany: from 1876, Rolnick and Weber (1995) have separate gold and silver series,
converted to dollars at $0.238 per Mark. Prior to 1876 they only have total coin. I estimate
the stock of silver in 1873 using the fact that 7.474m lb of silver were withdrawn to 1880, at
90M per lb (Laughlin 1886, 141). Until 1900 the silver stock contained a mix of thalers and
subsidiary silver; I use the US Mint reports’ estimates of the shares of each.
India: Atkinson (1909), Keynes (1913). Silver circulation in rupees converted to dollars
at market exchange rate, to ounces at R2.909 per oz.
Italy: total coin in Rolnick and Weber (1995) converted at $0.193 per Lira. I use the US
Mint reports to estimate the share of gold and silver in the total coin stock.
Japan: total coin in Rolnick and Weber (1995) converted at $0.498 per yen. Silver
amounts converted to weights at a 16.18 ratio until 1896, 32.36 in 1897–98, 28.75 after.
Netherlands: gold and silver stocks in Rolnick and Weber (1995), converted at $0.402
per gulden. Silver amounts converted to weights at a 15.5 ratio.
Portugal: gold and silver stocks in Rolnick and Weber (1995), converted at $1.08 per
thousand Milreis. Silver amounts converted to weights at a 14.08 ratio.
Russia: 1873-84: stocks from the Reports, see also the Report of 1887, p. 316. Nominal
values are converted to dollars at $0.772 per ruble. Silver amounts are converted to weights
at 15.45 in 1885, 15.5 in 1892–97, 23.24 after.
Spain: gold and silver stocks in Rolnick and Weber (1995), converted at $0.193 per
peseta. Silver amounts converted to weights at a 15.5 ratio.
United Kingdom: total coin in Rolnick and Weber converted to dollars at $4.866 per
pound sterling. I then use the US Mint reports for the silver stock and assign the rest of
total coin to gold. Silver amounts converted to weights at a 14.28 ratio.
United States: 1873–78, US Mint reports and interpolation; 1879–1913, Rolnick and
Weber 1995. Silver amounts converted to weights at a 16 ratio.
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